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Psychophysical judgements depend on prior events. 
When the response to the stimulus is affected by both, 
stimuli presented and responses obtained on previous trials, 
we speak of sequential effects. Although many psychology 
textbooks point out to the importance of sequential effects, 
most of the studies simply neglect them. In Lockhead’s 
(1992) words, a common assumption in psychophysical 
scaling models is that “attribute judgments are independent 
of time”. We can easily spot that attribute judgments are not 
independent of space (as in simultaneous lightness contrast) 
or of other attributes (as in the dependence of lightness per-
ception on perception of depth), but sequential effects are 
not that obvious. They can only be observed through special 
data analysis following the measurements, which is prob-
ably why they remain neglected. 
In the times of classical psychophysics when discrimi-
nation methods were mostly used, several studies revealed 
the existence of time errors on stimulus comparisons (see 
Guilford, 1954, for review). When stimuli are presented for 
comparative judgements, the second stimulus in the pair is 
systematically judged as greater or lesser than we should 
expect. For example, when the standard is compared with 
itself, there is an excess of judgements ‘greater’ for the sec-
ond stimulus. This is a negative time-order error. Koehler 
(as cited in Guilford, 1954) found that the time-order er-
ror depends on the time interval between stimuli, changing 
from the positive error at short interstimulus intervals to the 
negative one at longer interstimulus intervals. He explained 
the negative time-order error as a consequence of ‘reduced’ 
memory trace of the first stimulus. When this trace is com-
pared with the subsequent stimulus, the trace seems to have 
lower intensity. Lauenstein (as cited in Guilford, 1954) at-
tributed the effect to the assimilation of the trace from the 
first stimulus to the level of excitation between the onsets of 
the first and the second stimulus. Guilford (1954) wrote that 
it seems that the gist of the first stimulus in the pair regresses 
towards the central value of all the stimuli in the experiment, 
and that such regression effects may also be found in scaling 
methods whenever there is a lack of perfect discrimination. 
Later, when Stevens’ new psychophysics and direct scal-
ing was in the full swing, novel consequences of sequen-
tial effects became apparent. Holland and Lockhead (1968) 
asked people to make absolute judgements of the intensi-
ties of 10 tones varying in amplitude. They found that the 
mean response error was a function of the stimulus that 
occurred k trials earlier. Stimuli were overestimated when 
the prior stimulus was large and underestimated when the 
prior stimulus was small. In general, judgments tended to 
be similar to the value of the prior trial, which is known as 
assimilation, and they tended to be different from the stimuli 
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that occurred earlier in the sequence (two to five or more 
steps back), which is known as contrast. Later, most stud-
ies included both the previous signals and the previous re-
sponses in the regression equation when trying to predict the 
response to the current stimulus (see e. g. De Carlo & Cross, 
1990; Schifferstein & Frijters, 1992; Ward, 1982). 
The assimilation effect of the immediately preceding 
trial seems to be quite robust. It was found in magnitude 
estimation (DeCarlo, 2003; Ward, 1973), absolute identifi-
cations (Holland & Lockhead, 1968) and successive-ratio-
judgments (Lockhead & King, 1983), and somewhat smaller 
for cross-modality matching (Baird, Green, & Luce, 1980; 
Ward, 1975) and the method of production (DeCarlo, 2003; 
Green, Luce, & Duncan, 1977). Lockhead (1992) even 
stated: “There is assimilation in every set of psychophysical 
scaling data that has been examined and reported, no matter 
what the experimental procedure.” (p. 550).
Because Ward and Lockhead (1971) found assimilation 
in guessing studies where no stimuli were presented, Lock-
head (1992) mostly attributed assimilation to response bias. 
In a successive-ratios-judgment task, Lockhead and King 
(1983) found that when two tones of equal intensity were 
presented in succession, their ratio was estimated higher 
than 1 when the stimulus just prior to the current pair was 
less than the intensity of the pair, and lower than 1 when the 
immediately preceding stimulus was greater than the inten-
sity of the pair. Their interpretation was that the first stimu-
lus in the pair must have assimilated in memory toward the 
immediately preceding tone, and the second tone in pair was 
compared to this biased memory. They explained contrast 
effect of stimuli presented more than one step prior to the 
estimated stimulus as being associated with response adjust-
ments made by observers to correct for the errors caused by 
such assimilation. 
Although the first studies on sequential effects in ra-
tio methods (e. g., Holland & Lockhead, 1968; Wagner & 
Baird, 1981) reported that sequential effects extend over as 
many as five trials, it was shown later (see Jesteadt, Luce, 
and Green, 1977) that these effects are almost exclusively 
due to the signal and response on the previous trial and that 
there do not seem to be any sequential effects resulting from 
even earlier trials. When the effects of response on trial N–1 
was factored out, no effect of events on trials N–2 and before 
had any direct influence on the response on trial N anymore. 
Gregson (1992) stated that if psychophysical judgments are 
modelled as a dynamic system rather than as a static one, the 
occurrence of apparent assimilation together with contrast 
in the same data series is to be expected whenever some 
feedback and instability are involved. 
At the present time, the dilemma about how sequential 
effects should be modelled remains a challenge. Another 
important question is: Are these effects large enough and 
therefore devastating to the results of psychophysical meas-
urements? 
There is no straightforward answer to this question. One 
of the reasons for this is that sequential effects are not con-
stant over different stimuli. Previous stimuli affect the judg-
ment of the current stimulus in different ways, depending 
on their size. Ward and Lockhead (1971) reported that an 
extreme stimulus on the immediately preceding trial “at-
tracts” the response by 0.4 of a response category, whereas 
assimilation effect was much smaller for the stimuli in the 
middle of the range of intensities. Other studies (e.g., Baird 
et al., 1980; Green et al., 1977; Jesteadt et al., 1977) indicat-
ed that the magnitude of stimulus presented on trial N may 
not be the most important factor for the size of sequential 
effects. Instead, they found that sequential effects are strong 
when the difference between the two successive stimuli is 
small, but are much weaker when this difference is large. 
They claimed that assimilation effect is operating only in 
cases where the signal falls within the attention band that 
tends to be located in the region of the immediately preced-
ing signal. 
Lockhead (1992) argued that each judgment (he was 
referring to  psychophysical judgment, but we can easily 
extend this to judgments in other contexts) depends on so 
many different factors “that any prospect of removing their 
effects to reveal a true, underlying function is remote” (p. 
549). Teghtsoonian (1992), on the other hand, questioned 
the importance of context factors, at least for describing 
psychophysical relations. He claimed that no investigator 
believes that judgments of univariate stimuli are independ-
ent of space, time, and other features. Instead, those factors 
are important, but they are not equally important as the stim-
ulus intensity. Intensity is “so far above all other controlling 
factors that it is easy to identify it as the only pertinent fac-
tor” (p. 580).
Typical researchers in experimental psychology are 
aware of the fact that there are many validity issues regard-
ing their methods of measurement. They are aware of the 
fact that psychological phenomena are too complex to be 
studied extensively and validly in a laboratory. Most of them 
would probably agree with Lockhead (1992) that different 
attributes of objects simply cannot be judged in isolation. 
They would probably agree that sequential effects should 
always be taken into account, because a mass of studies con-
vincingly shows how non-trivial they are. So how can we 
take these effects into account? 
One of the options is to include these non-sensory fac-
tors in the psychophysical functions as additional param-
eters (Dzhafarov, 1992). However, it is doubtful whether we 
are able to determine the exact quality or magnitude of se-
quential effects, because we cannot identify all of the partic-
ipant’s previous experiences that may be important for the 
present judgment. In his adaptation theory, Helson (1964) 
claimed that adaptation level which becomes the point of 
reference for the psychological scale according to which the 
stimuli are judged, is affected both by other stimuli present 
(the background stimuli and other contextual stimuli) and 
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the experiences obtained prior to the experiment. Therefore, 
a series of pre-experimental adaptations should always be 
considered when forming a comprehensive frame of refer-
ence for the adaptation level, but this is extremely hard, if 
not impossible, to accomplish.
Other options are to counterbalance or randomize the tri-
als to control for the sequential effects in the long run. With 
counterbalancing and randomization we can be comforted 
that in extensive experiments sequential effects are neutral-
ized. But extensive experiments are not something that our 
participants could put up with easily. Who on Earth is able to 
do over three thousand trials, as G. T. Fechner (1860/1966) 
did, and maintain a constant level of motivation and avoid 
fatigue? In reality, experiments are limited in time, which is 
inevitably leading to the question whether the point at which 
data collection was terminated was the right one and will 
it allow a decent intra-personal neutralisation of sequential 
effects. Luckily, we include many participants in the study 
and these effects are then inter-personally neutralised. This 
may be satisfactory in nomothetic studies. But when one is 
doing an idiographic study, sequential effects may become 
extremely important. Books on qualitative research often 
mention that context is important, such as historical and so-
cioeconomic context, and social setting. In this collection 
of context factors we should definitely add short- and long-
range temporal context. Personal history and experiences, 
and also their temporal order, define each individual in a 
unique way. It seems that sequential effects are not trivial 
indeed, and they should be paid more attention to in studies 
with a smaller number of participants who are not subjected 
to extensive measurements within different conditions. 
Even in nomothetic studies sequential effects sometimes 
cannot be avoided and they can have substantial impact on 
the results. Sequential effects can be avoided in a careful-
ly planned study, such as in studies of sequential context, 
where numerous judgements of a certain stimulus are ob-
tained in two conditions and then compared. In one con-
dition preceding stimuli are smaller and in the other they 
are larger than the judged stimulus. Probabilities of the two 
conditions are balanced. In such studies, the target stimulus 
is not the most extreme stimulus presented, but instead lies 
somewhere in the middle of the series of all presented inten-
sities. In most other studies where sequential effects are not 
monitored extreme stimuli (stimuli at both sides of the range 
of intensities) are treated as any other stimuli in the pool and 
contribute to the outcome of the study. Let us elaborate on 
what can happen in such cases.
For example, let us imagine a magnitude estimation study 
on brightness perception. The exponent of psychophysical 
power function is around 1/3 for brightness perception. Let 
us imagine that we present 11 different stimuli to observers 
in the randomized trials and that the sensation magnitude 
increases uniformly. It is probably safe to say that when 
the sixth intensity is presented, the probability that the im-
mediately preceding stimulus was smaller equals the prob-
ability that the preceding stimulus was larger. Therefore, if 
assimilation to the prior stimulus occurs, it is reasonable to 
assume that it will be neutralised over many trials. But when 
the smallest stimulus is presented, the probability that prior 
stimulus was smaller equals zero. Therefore, if the effect of 
assimilation towards the stimulus presented on trial N–1 is 
much stronger than the contrast effect of stimuli presented 
on trials N–2 or before (and it usually is; see e.g. Lockhead, 
1992), the estimated magnitude will be larger than it should 
be (i.e., than it would have been had there been no sequen-
tial effects). The eleventh intensity will, equivalently, be 
judged smaller than it would have been with no sequential 
effects taking place. Therefore, stimuli smaller than the me-
dium one would all be overestimated, increasingly so for 
the more extreme ones, and stimuli larger than the medium 
one would all be underestimated. This outcome would re-
semble the regression to the mean. In the end, sequential 
effects could result in a changed (i.e., too decelerated) psy-
chophysical function. 
If the finding that sequential effects are stronger for more 
extreme stimuli could be generalized to other psychological 
domains, this would have some important consequences. 
For example, in case of psychological assessment, regres-
sion of judgements of extreme items (e. g., items expressing 
extremely positive or negative attitude) towards the mean 
would result in too narrow dispersions of responses, which 
may in the next step lead to too low correlations among 
items and lower internal consistency of scales. It could 
also compromise their validity. Specifically, it could lead 
to underestimation of criterion validity of the scale. High 
correlations among different psychological constructs are 
rare, and perhaps sequential effects, although indirectly, add 
something to this misfortune. One must also recall that in a 
typical psychometric measurement items are presented in 
the same order to every person. Even if there is no regres-
sion-to-the-mean effect, assimilation or contrast effects are 
very difficult to neutralise across participants. 
In psychophysics, the sequential effects are usually stud-
ied over extensive periods of time, and their average effect 
is extracted from data. However, it was already Guilford 
(1954) who wrote that learning, as well as other background 
stimuli, can affect the time-order errors. It is reasonable to 
assume that sequential effects themselves vary in time, so 
although we may be able to determine how they operate 
throughout a longer period, we may never be able to deter-
mine how they operate at a specific moment in time. Conse-
quently, we may not be able to include them in the psycho-
physical equation properly. It seems that a post hoc analysis 
of those effects and a subsequent adjustment of results may 
not be the optimal procedure for controlling these effects.
What would be a better way to control for the sequential 
effects? Perhaps a better way would be to ensure that in our 
studies they do not emerge at all. Jesteadt et al. (1977) pre-
sented several “erase” stimuli, randomly selected from the 
entire signal range, between different trials, and they found 
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that sequential effects were eliminated. In cross-modality 
matching, the changed initial value of the variable stimu-
lus in each trial reduced sequential effects (Teghtsoonian, 
Teghtsoonian, & DeCarlo, 2008). Thus, it seems that load-
ing attentional resources, inserting some new, irrelevant 
stimuli in the series, and erasing the memory trace of prior 
stimuli and responses may be helpful in controlling the se-
quential effects. Future studies will have to show what kinds 
of stimuli work best at achieving this goal.
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